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FOREWORD
The purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-596) is
to assure safe and healthful working conditions for every working person and to preserve
our human resources.  In this Act, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) is charged with recommending occupational safety and health
standards and describing exposures that are safe for various periods of employment,
including (but not limited to) the exposures at which no worker will suffer diminished
health, functional capacity, or life expectancy as a result of his or her work experience.
Current Intelligence Bulletins (CIBs) are issued by NIOSH to disseminate new scientific
information about occupational hazards.  A CIB may draw attention to a formerly
unrecognized hazard, report new data on a known hazard, or disseminate information
about hazard control.  CIBs are distributed to representatives of academia, industry,
organized labor, public health agencies, and public interest groups as well as to Federal
agencies responsible for ensuring the safety and health of workers.
Each year in Alaskan waters, an average of 34 fishing vessels and 24 lives are lost in the
commercial fishing industry, which equates to an occupational fatality rate of 140/
100,000 workers/year, 20 times the national average.  The extremely high risk of fatal
injury to commercial fishers provided the impetus for NIOSH efforts to more
comprehensively identify risk factors and prevention strategies within the commercial
fishing industry.
This CIB reviews what is known about fatal fishing incidents in Alaska, defines
problems, describes recent successes, and recommends general approaches to
preventing fatal events.  Our hope is that this document will serve as a catalyst to further
injury prevention efforts to reduce commercial fishing fatalities in Alaskan waters, and
other regions involved in cold water fishing.
Linda Rosenstock, M.D., M.P.H.
Director, National Institute for
   Occupational Safety and Health
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
iv
ABSTRACT
This document describes the fatal events in the Alaska commercial fishing industry and
recommends strategies to prevent or reduce the seriousness of these events.
Fishing fatality rates vary substantially by fishery.  Alaskan fisheries differ in geographic
location of fishing grounds, type of harvesting equipment and techniques, time of year,
and duration.  Crabbing is particularly hazardous, because harvesting of most crab
species in Alaska generally takes place during the winter months, with short daylight
hours and often in rough weather conditions.
The etiologic factors for Alaska commercial fishing deaths are complex.  Type of
harvesting equipment and techniques, fatigue, and environmental conditions contribute
to the severity of these events.  The critical factors that must be addressed for definitive
prevention efforts in this industry are vessel stability and hull integrity, training and
licensing of skippers and crew, management practices, human factors, avoidance of the
harsh sea and weather conditions, falls overboard, and unsafe diving practices.
The progress made in the previous six years in saving the lives of fishermen has occurred
primarily in saving lives after a vessel casualty.  Fishermen now generaly know how to
use the safety equipment required by the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act
and the highly effective men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard are often able to rescue
them.   We recommend augmenting this approach to commercial fishing fatalities by
preventing these disasters in the first place, as well as preparing to react to them if they
should occur.
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What are the hazards?
Each year in Alaskan waters, an average of 34 fishing vessels and 24 lives are lost in the commercial
fishing industry.  This represents an occupational fatality rate of 140/100,000/year, 20 times the
national average.  Most of the deceased fishermen drowned, are presumed drowned, and/or died
from hypothermia as a result of either vessel-related events (capsizings or sinkings), or falling
overboard.  Some of the factors that put workers in the commercial fishing industry at risk are
working on open, unstable platforms (decks); fatigue; and environmental conditions.
How can a worker be exposed or put at risk?
Any worker in the commercial fishing industry can become a fatality, but the risks are much greater
in certain fisheries, which differ in geographic location of fishing grounds, type of harvesting
equipment and techniques, time of year, and duration of respective fishing seasons.  For the Alaskan
commercial fishing industry, crab fishermen have the highest risk for a fatality.  Crabbing is
particularly hazardous because harvesting of most crab species in Alaska generally takes place
during the winter months, often in conditions of cold air and water temperatures, high winds, snow,
sleet, ice, short daylight hours, and high seas.
What recommendations has the Federal government made to protect workers’
health?
The hazards of commercial fishing captured the attention of Congress, which enacted the
Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act (CFIVSA) of 1988.  This Act required, among other
things, each vessel to carry various survival equipment.  The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is
charged with enforcing these requirements.  The Act also directed the Secretary of Transportation
to conduct an assessment of safety problems in the industry.  This safety assessment was completed
by the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering
and its findings were published in 1991.  Their recommendations included proposals for safety
administration and for alternatives that are related to vessels, personnel, survival, and fisheries
management.  The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has also proposed several safety
recommendations for the commercial fishing industry.  NIOSH recommendations focusing on
prevention are included in this Current Intelligence Bulletin.
Where can more information be found?
The references at the end of this document provide a useful inventory of published reports and
literature.  A number of commercial fishing associations, marine safety education organizations, and
professionals in occupational safety and health have also developed materials regarding commercial






CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 58
COMMERCIAL FISHING FATALITIES IN ALASKA
Risk Factors and Prevention Strategies
INTRODUCTION
The working conditions in the Alaska commercial
fishing industry are very hazardous and are
compounded by isolated fishing grounds, seasonal
darkness, cold waters, high winds, icing, and brief
fishing seasons.  This setting has resulted in a
remarkably high occupational fatality rate of 140/
100,000/year from 1991-1996 for Alaska’s
commercial fishing workers. More than 80% of
these deaths have been due to drowning; presumed
drowning; or drowning plus hypothermia associ-
ated with vessel capsizings, sinkings, or falls
overboard.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of this document is to report on the
commercial fishing-related fatalities in Alaska and
make recommendations for their prevention.
During the 1970s and 1980s, Alaska experienced a
boom in its commercial fishing industry.  By the
mid-1980s, it became clear that commercial
fishing-related deaths were the principal contribu-
tor to Alaska’s very high occupational fatality rate
[Bell et al. 1990].  Based on data from the National
Traumatic Occupational Fatalities (NTOF) sur-
veillance system, Alaska had the highest state-
specific, work-related fatality rate during 1980-
1989— 34.8 deaths per 100,000 workers per year,
nearly five times the annual average for the United
States (7.0 per 100,000) [NIOSH 1993].
According to the United States Coast Guard
(USCG), Alaska experienced more than 20
commercial fishing fatalities per year from 1982-
1987, while nationally there were, on average, 108
deaths in the commercial fishing industry each
year during the same interval [NRC 1991].
Another study found that an average of 31
fishermen died each year in Alaska from 1980-
1988 [Schnitzer et al. 1993].  The hazards of
commercial fishing captured the attention of
Congress, which enacted the Commercial Fishing
Industry Vessel Safety Act (CFIVSA) of 1988.
This Act required, among other things, that each
vessel carry various survival equipment and
instructed the Secretary of Transportation to
conduct an assessment of safety problems in the
industry.  This safety assessment was completed
by the National Research Council (NRC) of the
National Academies of Sciences and Engineering
and its findings were published in 1991 [NRC
1991].  During 1990-1995, the CFIVSA required
fishing vessels to carry specific safety, survival,
and fire-fighting equipment,  and mandated crew
members to obtain first aid and emergency drill
tr ining.
In 1991, because of the high occupational fatality
rate in Alaska, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of
Safety Research, initiated efforts in Alaska to
improve surveillance, describe risk factors, and
coordinate prevention efforts for fatalities and
serious occupational injuries by establishing the
Alaska field station.  The NIOSH Alaska field
station is charged with collecting information on
all occupational fatalities, focusing on those
associated with the fishing, logging, and air
transport industries.  Fatalities in the commercial
fishing industry, Alaska’s largest private em-
ployer [NRC 1991], are among the highest
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industry-specific rates in the United States
[NIOSH 1993;  Schnitzer et al. 1993; CDC 1993;
Kennedy et al. 1994]. The Alaska field station’s
comprehensive surveillance system for commer-
cial fishing fatalities in Alaska collects data from a
variety of sources including USCG reports, its
own interviews of survivors, National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (NTSB) preliminary and final
investigative reports, Alaska state trooper reports,
medical examiner reports, review of death
certificates, and local news media reports [NIOSH
1997].
FISHING IN ALASKA
A variety of fishing gear and techniques are used in
the fishing fleets in Alaska, and specific hazards
are associated with each.  The small boat or near-
shore fleet fish for salmon, herring, halibut, and
black cod, using gillnetting, long-lining, seining,
and trolling.  The shellfish fishery and the
groundfish fishery comprise the offshore fleet
which utilize crabbing and trawling gear.
Fatality rates varied substantially by fishery,
which differ in geographic location of fishing
grounds, type of harvesting equipment and
techniques, time of year, and duration of
respective fishing seasons. Crabbing, a shellfish
fishery, is particularly hazardous because harvest-
ing of most crab species in Alaska generally takes
place during the winter months, often in conditions
of cold air and water temperatures, high winds,
snow, sleet, ice, short daylight hours, and high
seas.  In addition, the basic equipment used in
crabbing are large steel cages (“pots”) that weigh
up to 800 pounds each (empty) and require great
physical strength and the use of cranes for
placement, retrieval, and stowage.  Crab pots also
require fishermen to crawl inside to bait them
before they are launched over the side.  Stacking
crab pots on deck can also severely compromise
vessel stability, especially if accompanied by icing
of the vessel structure and the crab pots.
FATALITIES IN THE COMMERCIAL FISH-
ING INDUSTRY IN ALASKA
The NIOSH Alaska field station collected and
analyzed information on fishing-related fatalities
that occurred during the 6-year period 1991-1996,
including the location of the vessel, the fishery in
which the vessel was operating, circumstances
surrounding the incident, demographics of the
victims, and survival equipment used [NIOSH
1997].  Fatalities were divided among different
fisheries into three major areas:  falls overboard,
deck injuries (e.g., being crushed by crab pots or
falling through hatchways), and vessel-related
events (i.e., capsizings, sinkings, or missing
vessels).  Fatality rates were calculated for each
type of fishery by estimating the full-time
equivalent worker population of the fishery within
which the vessel was operating at the time of the
fatal event [CDC 1993; Rodgers et al. 1980; Focht
1986; NIOSH 1994a].
During 1991-1996, a total of 427 occupational
fatalities occurred in Alaska. Commercial fisher-
men made up 146 (34%) of these fatalities.  Given
the mean full-time equivalent Alaska commercial
fishing workforce of 17,400 [CDC 1993; NIOSH
1994], this is equivalent to a fatality rate of  140/
100,000/year, 20 times the overall U.S. occupa-
tional fatality rate (7.0/100,000/year) [NIOSH
1993].  This average fishing fatality rate has
considerable variation by fishery:  shellfish
(primarily crab) had the highest rate among
fisheries (356/100,000/year), followed by herring
(167/100,000/year), and halibut (122/100,000/
year) (Figure 1).
Fishing fatalities occur primarily during the
months when the greatest number of fishermen are
w rking, particularly in the near-shore fisheries
(e.g., salmon, herring and cod) from May-
September (68, 47%).  However, a peak also
occurs in November, January, and February (56,
38%) when the winter crab fisheries are open in the
Bering Sea (Figure 2).  Almost one-half of all
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Figure 1.  Commercial Fishing Fatality Rates by Fishery— Alaska, 1991–1996.
































Figure 2.  Fishing Fatalities by Month— Alaska, 1991–1996, n=146.
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Figure 3.  Fishing Fatalities by Location— Alaska, 1991–1996, n=146.






















fatalities (70, 48%) occurred in the Bering Sea,
Southeast Alaska and the Aleutian/Pribilof area
(Figure 3).
Most (128, 87%) of the deceased fishermen
drowned;  were presumed drowned; and/or died
from hypothermia as a result of either vessel-
related events (capsizings or sinkings) (92, 63%),
falling overboard (31, 21%), or diving incidents
(5, 3%).  Other victims died as a result of deck
injuries (e.g., crushed by crab pots, entangled in
winches).  Of the 92 people who were killed in
vessel-related events, most (44, 48%) were
participating in the shellfish fishery.  Likewise, of
those who fell overboard and drowned, the largest
fishery-specific number of decedents (13, 42%)
were also participating in the shellfish fishery.
The falling-overboard fatalities can be divided
further into the reasons for the victims being
immersed in water:  entanglement in a net or line
(9, 29%), unobserved fall (victim missing from
vessel) (8, 26%), observed fall (8, 26%), or
washed into the water (6, 19%) (Figure 4).
Of the 128 fishermen who drowned, almost half of
them (60, 47%) were not wearing any type of
personal flotation device (PFD) while 12 (9%)
were.  For 56 (44%) of those who died or are
presumed dead, primarily those lost at sea with no
body recovered, it is unknown whether they were
wearing any type of PFD.  Of fishermen involved
in a fatal incident in which at least one other
fisherman drowned, 55% of the survivors were
wearing an immersion suit (a.k.a. survival suit).
Of the 31 fishermen who died after falling
overboard, none was wearing any type of PFD.
Just over one-half (51%) of the fishermen who
ied in Alaska from 1991-1996 were not year-
round residents of Alaska.  Many vessels and crew
members come from Washington, Oregon, and
California to fish in Alaskan waters.
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(2 while intoxicated with ethanol)
Figure 4.   Man Overboard Events by Circumstance— Alaska, 1991–1996,  n=31.
Source:  NIOSH [1997].
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The number of fatalities varied by fishery (Figure
5). From 1991 to 1996, in the Alaskan crab
fisheries, 30 fatal events resulted in 61 (42% of all)
fatalities. Forty-three percent (n=13) of these
incidents and 72% of the fatalities were vessel-
related, and the majority (62%) of the vessels
reportedly were operating in heavy weather
conditions (defined as winds > 25 knots and/or
waves >15 feet). In the salmon fishery in Alaska,
23 fatal events resulted in 26 fatalities. Eleven of
these incidents (14 fatalities) were vessel-related,
but most (73%) of the vessels were reportedly
sailing in moderately calm waters at the time of the
incident.  Ten of these 26 salmon fishing-related
fatalities occurred after falling overboard, half of
them in calm waters.  From 1991-1994, 6 fatal
events resulted in 11 fatalities in the halibut fishery
in Alaska; all of these incidents were vessel-
related, and all occurred in heavy seas. No
fatalities occurred in the halibut fishery in 1995 or
1996.
Diving fatalities are an emerging problem in
Alaska’s commercial fishing industry as five
divers died while working during the study period.
Three of these diving fatalities occurred among
inexperienced divers attempting to untangle nets
or lines that had snagged on the ocean floor or
vessel propellers.  The divers themselves became
entangled in the nets or the lines and could not
surface.  Of the three victims, one was a newly
certified recreational diver, another was reportedly
experienced but not certified as a recreational
diver, and the third also had no type of diving
certification and very little experience.  These
divers were all using self-contained underwater
breathing apparatus (SCUBA) equipment.  The
other two diving fatalities involved sea cucumber
divers who drowned while diving.  Both divers
were using surface-supplied-air diving equipment.
DISCUSSION
Our mortality findings reinforce those for the
Alaska commercial fishing industry in previous
reports of surveillance data, incident investiga-
tions, and survey information collected for 1980-
1992 by NIOSH [Schnitzer et al. 1993; Schnitzer

































Figure 5.  Fishing Fatalities by Fishery— Alaska, 1991–1996,  n=146.
Source:  NIOSH [1997].
Figure 6.  Implementation of the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Safety Act of 1988 and
Fishing Fatalities by Year— Alaska, 1991–1996,  n=146.
Source:  NIOSH [1997].
*Note that in 1994 an anomaly occurred: due to low crab stocks, the Bristol Bay red king crab fishery was suspended.
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Number of Number of Case
Number of persons persons Fatality
Year vessels lost* on board* killed* Rate†‡
1991 39   93 25 27%
1992 44 113 26 23%
1993 24   83 14 17%
1994 36 131   4   3%
1995 26 106 11 10%
1996 38 114 13 11%
Table 1.  Recent Decrease in the Case Fatality Rate,
Alaska Commercial Fishing Industry, 1991–1996.
*Source: U.S. Coast Guard, 17th District, Fishing Vessel Safety
Coordinator.
†Case Fatality Rate = (number killed / number at risk) x 100%
‡Chi-square for linear trend = 14.287, p<0.00016
September 1997 7
et al. 1991], USCG [USCG 1992a], NRC [NRC
1991], NTSB [NTSB 1987]  and the University of
Alaska [Knapp and Ronan 1991]. These data
indicate that the workers at greatest risk for
fishing-related fatal injuries are those who fish for
crab aboard unstable vessels. Our more recent
findings (since 1992) show a reduction of fatalities
in the vessel-related events involving fisheries
other than crab (Figure 6).
Since the implementation of the CFIVSA,
requiring survival suits, life rafts, electronic
position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs), and
emergency drill training, fewer fishermen have
been lost after their vessels either capsized or sank.
It should be noted that in 1994 an anomaly
occurred due to a reduction of crab stocks and a
closure of the largest red king crab fishery (Bristol
Bay) in Alaska [Lincoln 1997a]. The processed net
weight of crab was down 51% in 1994 from 1992
[ADF&G 1995].
Our analysis of USCG vessel casualty statistics
[USCG 1996] from 1991-1996 revealed that over
the 6-year period, the number of vessel casualties
(vessels lost) has remained relatively constant
(mean 34.5, median 37), as has the number of
people on board (number at risk) (mean 106.7,
median 110).  However, the case-fatality rate
(number killed/number at risk) associated with
these vessel casualties has dropped significantly
from 27% in 1991 to 11% in 1996 (Table 1).
Management Regimes
Until recently, the shrinking halibut resource was
managed as a “derby style” fishery, with
progressively shorter seasons. This often forced
participants, in order to fish at all, to fish in unsafe
weather conditions, work continuously for long
periods without rest, and possibly overload their
vessels due to limited openings  (usually 24-hour
periods on dates established months before, and
not changeable in response to weather conditions).
In 1995, a new fishery management regime,
individual fishing quotas (IFQ), was implemented
for the Alaskan halibut and sable fish (black cod)
fisheries.  An IFQ allocation was based upon the
participation and catch records from the previous 5
years. The IFQ program assigned individual catch
limits for each vessel.  IFQs allow each skipper to
consider market conditions, weather, and the
vessel’s capacity when planning trips.  The
absence of any fatal events since the implementa-
tion of IFQs in the halibut fishery and the drop in
USCG Search and Rescue (SAR) missions for the
halibut fishery from 33 in 1994 to 7 in 1996 are
very encouraging  (Figure 7).  However, it is not
possible to ascertain if a direct cause-and-effect
relationship exists between the implementation of
IFQs and the reduction of these events.
The Sustainable Fisheries Act (Public Law 104-
297 [S. 39]; October 11, 1996, also known as the
Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act of 1996)
prohibits any fisheries management council from
submitting, and the Secretary of Commerce from
approving or implementing, any more IFQ
programs before October 1, 2000.  Also, in
submitting and approving any new IFQ programs
after that date, the fisheries management councils
and the Secretary of Commerce are required to
consider a report (from the National Academy of
Sciences) studying the IFQ program. Congress is
requiring submission of this report by October 1,
NIOSH CIB 58 Commercial Fishing Fatalities in Alaska
Figure 7.  Halibut Fishery-Related Search and Rescue (SAR) Missions and Fatalities by Year—
Alaska, 1992–1996.
Source: U.S. Coast Guard, 17th District, Fishing Vessel Safety Coordinator.
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1998, and the report must include recommenda-
tions to implement a national policy for IFQs. The
report will  address, among other things, social and
economic issues, and the safety of life and vessels
in each fishery. Applying findings of the NAS
report to management regimes will be important,
since most of the crab, cod, pollock, sea cucumber,
and sea urchin fisheries are still managed as non-
limited-entry fisheries.
USCG and the CFIVSA
The success of the interventions implemented over
the past decade in preventing loss of life in
Alaskan fishermen is remarkable. However, the
continuing circumstance of 25 to 45 vessels being
lost every year and approximately 100 persons
requiring rescue annually from cold Alaskan
waters places a tremendous economic burden on
taxpayers and persistent risk to the rescuers. The
average cost of an SAR mission in Alaska is
$6800.  SAR missions in Alaska average 1100
each year, so the average annual cost is nearly $7.5
million.  During the first three quarters of FY 1997,
the 17th USCG District has spent over $6.5 million
on SAR missions [Jorgenson 1997].  Successful
rescue is still dependent on the expertly trained and
highly effective men and women of the USCG
SAR operations, and are subject to the vagaries of
the seas and the weather [Conway and Lincoln
1995].  Furthermore, the young men and women
involved in USCG SAR operations themselves
experience considerable occupational risks in
transit to and during these rescue attempts.
“When you call the Coast Guard...you
are asking them to risk their lives to save
yours.  The rescuers neither ask for nor
get much in return, and they value their
lives as much as we value ours.  It is the
duty of those who go to sea to avoid
getting into situations that require the
aid of the rescue services -- heed the
season, equip your vessel properly, keep
a sharp eye for weather changes, shake
down a new vessel conscientiously,
don’t expect your ship to do something
she can’t, pump for your life if you’re
sinking, maneuver your vessel if you’re
not, think ahead.  Anything less and you
will be asking more of others than you
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The impressive progress made during the early
1990s in reducing mortality has occurred
primarily by keeping fishermen who have
evacuated capsized or sinking vessels afloat and
warm (using immersion suits and life rafts), and
being able to locate them readily via EPIRBs.  All
of these regulations were required to be
implemented between 1990 and 1995 by the
CFIVSA.  This Act classified all waters in Alaska
(including bays, inlets, harbors, and rivers) as
“cold” waters (<60°F,<15.6°C), in which hypo-
thermia can lead to death by drowning within
minutes of immersion.  As a result, immersion
suits are required by the CFIVSA to be available
for all crew members on board vessels operating in
Alaskan waters [46 CFR 28.110].  Immersion suits
provide flotation and thermal protection from cold
water temperatures and are critical for survival
during immersions in cold waters [Steinman
1994].   This intervention has permitted many
fishermen to survive much longer in the water
while awaiting rescue.  Given their bulkiness, it is
not practical to wear immersion suits routinely
while working on deck (Appendix I).  However,
availability of immersion suits combined with
training (see Recommendation #5 on page 11) can
improve emergency preparedness and response
among fishermen, and thereby improve the
chances of survival.
The CFIVSA enabled the USCG to set up the
Voluntary Dockside Exam Program in 1992.  It is
a voluntary program in which fishermen permit
USCG examiners to board their vessels and review
the safety equipment onboard, including EPIRBs,
immersion suits, and life rafts, and to discuss the
new regulations.  The examiners include
individuals with a wide marine safety, search and
rescue, and law enforcement background.  The
program has been quite successful as a means to
communicate with and educate fishermen.  The
Dockside Exam Program helps bring vessels into
compliance and encourages the crew to seek
required training.  One drawback of the Voluntary
Dockside Exam Program is that it does not address
vessel stability, hull integrity, machinery, con-
struction, or fire protection standards [Lincoln
1997b].
RECOMMENDATIONS
The etiologic factors for Alaska commercial
fishing deaths are complex (Appendix II, Matrix
#1).  Gear type, fatigue, and environmental
conditions also contribute to the severity of work-
related incidents.
The CFIVSA primarily emphasizes the use and
availability of safety equipment during and after a
disaster at sea (Appendix II, Matrix #2).  The
findings presented in this report demonstrate
considerable reductions in fatalities in some
sectors of this industry, while persistent problems
remain in other areas.  We recommend
augmenting this approach to commercial fishing
fatalities by preventing these disasters in the first
place, as well as continuing to prepare to react to
them if they should occur.    Additional efforts
must be made to reduce the frequency of vessel
capsizings and sinkings, particularly during
crabbing operations, and to prevent fishermen
from falling overboard.
The Alaska Interagency Working Group for the
Prevention of Occupational Injuries, established
in 1991, provides an opportunity for various
Federal, State, and municipal agencies involved in
occupational safety and health to meet.  In addition
to fostering better cooperation between agencies,
this group can develop and assist industry in
implementation of intervention strategies that will
prevent some of the injuries and illnesses that
occur in Alaska’s work places.  During the March
1997 Working Group meeting, several subcom-
mittees were formed, including a commercial
fishing subcommittee, which includes govern-
mental agencies, nonprofit (and nongovernmen-
tal) organizations, and industry representatives.
The purpose of this new fishing industry-specific
working group is to identify the root causes of
NIOSH CIB 58 Commercial Fishing Fatalities in Alaska
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fishing casualties, to develop countermeasures for
each root cause, and to report their findings.  The
working group will also formulate recommenda-
tions to reduce these fatalities and participate in the
evaluation of the effectiveness of interventions.
The critical etiologic factors the subcommittee has
identified that must be addressed for definitive,
primary prevention efforts in this industry are
vessel stability and hull integrity to keep vessels
afloat, licensing and training of operators and crew
to ensure a minimum level of competency,
management regimes, avoidance of the most harsh
sea and weather conditions, falls overboard, and
unsafe diving practices (Appendix II, Matrix #3).
Vessel Stability and Hull Integrity
Recommendation #1:  A requirement for periodic
stability reassessment and vessel inspection of all
vessels should be seriously considered, as
equipping and retrofitting can substantially
affect the stability of vessels.
Recommendation #2:  Minimum specifications
for watertight components and bulkheads
sufficient to keep swamped or capsized vessels
afloat should also be developed, implemented
and evaluated.
Since vessel-related events continue to claim the
most lives, they warrant the greatest attention.  It
has been shown previously that the presence of
crab pots on deck provide the most potentially
dangerous safety condition and that older wooden
vessels are most commonly involved in capsizings
[Storch 1974].  While the requirements of the
CFIVSA have greatly improved the chances of a
successful rescue after a vessel capsizes or sinks,
the capsizing events themselves should be
generally preventable, as vessel stability is
measurable and predictable.  By integral design
enhancements and subsequent modifications (e.g.,
retrofitting of sponsons); by careful attention to
loading, possibly with additional (empirical)
stability tests when loaded; by considering use of
c llapsible crab pots; and by anticipating and
planning for the uses of the vessel and for
necessary adaptations to environmental factors,
vessels can be made much less susceptible to
capsizing/sinking due to sudden changes in
weather.  In their 1991 report [NRC 1991] the
NRC recommended that the USCG establish
minimum standards for vessel design and
construction or conversion of vessels.
As stated previously, the NTSB conducted a
Safety Study of Uninspected Commercial Fishing
Vessel Safety in 1987 [NTSB 1987].  It
recommended seeking legislative authority to
require that stability tests be conducted and that
complete stability information be provided to the
captains of commercial fishing vessels (NTSB
Recommendation M-86-11) [NTSB 1987].  Cur-
rently, there are stability requirements for new or
ltered (after September 15, 1991) vessels greater
than or equal to 79 feet in length.  While stability
requirements for vessels less than 79 feet have
been controversial, development of stability
criteria for these smaller vessels is imperative,
even if it requires an entirely different method and
approach than that used for large vessels.
Licensing and Training of Skippers
R commendation #3: A thorough assessment
should be made of current training requirements
and efforts, and deficiencies should be immedi-
ately corrected.
The NRC recommended that the USCG establish
regulations requiring that each person involved in
vessel operations acquire skills necessary to their
duties through a certification program and
licensing requirement [NRC 1991]. NTSB also
recommended in its report that the USCG seek
legislative authority to require the licensing of
captains of commercial fishing vessels, including
a requirement that they demonstrate minimum
qualifications in vessel safety including rules of
the road, vessel stability, firefighting, water tight
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integrity, and the use of lifesaving equipment
(NTSB Recommendation M-85-68) [NTSB 1987].
The USCG has submitted a licensing plan and
inspection program to Congress [USCG 1992b].
The licensing plan requires knowledge of stability
for the master of a vessel.  The persistent
contribution of vessel instability to vessel
casualties (in the face of no implementation of
such a licensing program) and to the consequent
deaths of fishermen should be addressed.
Human Factors
Recommendation #4:  Consideration should be
given to establishing adequate watchkeeping and
staffing requirements for all vessels.
Minimum watchkeeping and staffing require-
ments currently exist for uninspected fishing
vessels over 200 gross tons.  It has been well
documented that long hours and fatigue are a
major part of fisheries in Alaska [NRC 1991].  The
hazards of deep-sea fishing vessels have been
summarized previously by asserting that the
causes of vessel casualties include negligent
navigation and fatigue [Schilling 1971].
Training of Crew
Recommendation #5:  Consideration should be
given to requiring the successful completion of
basic fishing safety training, such as those
programs currently offered by the Alaska Marine
Safety Education Association (AMSEA), before
an Alaskan (state) crew license or a commercial
fishing permit is issued.
In addition to the safety gear requirement, the
CFIVSA requires assurance from the master of
each vessel that safety drills involving the use of
safety equipment are conducted at least once a
month.  The individual conducting the safety drills
must be trained in the proper procedures.
AMSEA, formed in 1985 to address many of the
risks described here, has played a major role in
preparing Alaska’s fishermen to meet these needs.
AMSEA provides an intensive 18-24 hour course
covering emergency preparedness, response, and
survival training which includes the use of this
survival equipment and instructions for conduct-
i g emergency drills on deck.  As of the end of
1996, AMSEA had trained 3300 fishermen.  A
retrospective evaluation of the effectiveness of
this training showed that it had a measurable effect
in reducing drownings among commercial
fishermen [Perkins 1995].  In other studies it has
been recommended that improving worker
training, using PFDs, maintaining safety equip-
ment, and developing improved clothing and
personal flotation devices can save lives [Driscoll
et al. 1994].
Management Regimes
Recommendation #6: All current and proposed
management regimes should be examined from a
safety and health perspective.
The management of fisheries must ensure the
preservation of the resource, while optimizing the
opportunities for fishermen, and allowing local
authorities and fishermen the freedom to exercise
judgement about the advisability of fishing in
current conditions so as not to exert undue pressure
to fish in poor weather.
Harsh Sea and Weather Conditions
Recommendation #7:  Weather information
should be more closely heeded.
Weather buoy observations are now accessible via
the Internet and should be used in conjunction with
nomographic estimates for icing hazard, [USCG
1986; Ball 1978], enabling the trained skipper to
m ke an informed decision whether to sail, return
to port, or seek a protected anchorage before the
worst conditions occur.
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Icing of the ship’s superstructure can rapidly
compromise the stability of any vessel and
predispose it to capsizing.  Icing nomograms show
the relationship between air temperature, surface
wind speed, and water temperature to the rate of
ice accumulation, and can be used to predict icing
hazard [Ball 1978].  The National Weather Service
includes vessel icing forecasts with their regular
weather broadcasts as a service to fishermen.  The
forecasts are given in four categories:  light,
moderate, heavy, or very heavy freezing spray
[Ball 1978] (Appendix III).
Falls Overboard
Recommendation #8: All fishermen should wear
PFDs when on the deck of any vessel [NIOSH
1994b].
In overboard events where the victim is entangled
in the gear, or is not observed falling overboard, a
PFD might not result in a successful rescue.
However, in 45% of the fatal man-overboard
(MOB) cases from 1991 to 1996, the victim was
not tangled in gear and was observed falling
overboard, and should have been floatable and
recoverable if the vessel had been adequately
prepared for an emergency.  Also, anecdotal
concerns by fishermen about entanglement in lines
by many PFD’s are not supported by the events.
All entanglements resulting in a fatal MOB event
involved the entanglement of an extremity (arm or
foot) rather than clothing covering the torso.  An
expanding number of compact PFD options
unlikely to interfere with deck operations (self-
inflating vests, pile-lined jackets, and suspenders),
have become commercially available during the
past decade.
Recommendation #9: MOB alarms should be
thoroughly evaluated and widely deployed if such
evaluations demonstrate that the devices are
effective.
Man overboard alarms are worn by fishermen to
alert others that they have fallen overboard.  The
devices operate by automatically setting off an
alarm when the fishermen fall into the water.
These devices, which can be linked to personal
EPIRBs and vessel automated cutoff (“deadman”)
switches, have recently become commercially
vailable.  They show promising results in efficacy
studies, although their effectiveness in saving
someone from drowning remains unevaluated.
Recommendation #10: Thorough study of the
handling of lines, especially during deployment
of crab pots, should be conducted to reduce
worker exposure to this hazard.
The frequency of line entanglement resulting in
man-overboard events is high.  As indicated
elsewhere in this bulletin, many of these events are
not likely to be mitigated by PFD usage.
Diving Events
Recommendation #11: A training curriculum
should be developed, implemented, and evalu-
ated for fishermen who are harvesting seafood or
clearing lines or nets by diving.
Dive-related fatalities have emerged as a new
problem in Alaska. Recently a new dive fishery for
sea cucumbers has emerged in Southeast Alaska
and Kodiak, and some fishermen for other species
have encountered trouble when they dive to check
their vessels or to clear nets or lines.
During 1992-1993, six persons died while diving
for sea urchins off the coast of Maine.  Authorities
identified inexperienced divers and persons
unfamiliar with operating vessels in adverse sea
and weather conditions as the groups at greatest
risk [CDC 1994]. As a result, Maine passed
mergency regulations to require (1) persons to be
a resident of Maine to participate in the fishery, (2)
divers must show proof that they are certified in
basic open water diving from any recognized
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national association, (3) both divers and tenders
must attend a competency class, and (4) tenders
must be licenced by attending a competency class.
Since the implementation of this program in 1994,
only one diver has been killed [Fetterman 1997].
CURRENT EFFORTS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Effective surveillance and interventions for
commercial fishing-related injury mortality in
Alaska, historically the worst-case setting in the
U.S., should provide a useful paradigm and
productive venue for prevention of similar deaths
elsewhere in the U.S.  The substantial progress
made to date in Alaska’s most hazardous industry
through the thoughtful application of the public
health model and incorporation of new technolo-
gies and comprehensive training should encourage
others to try similar approaches elsewhere and for
other problems.  Building further on the progress
already made in preventing deaths in this
historically dangerous occupation could lead to a
much safer working life for commercial fishermen
plying their trade in Alaskan waters.
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Matrix 1 .  Features of Commercial Fishing Injury Events—Alaska
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Matrix 2 .  Alaska Commercial Fishing Injury Countermeasures
Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Act of 1988
(Implemented 1990–1995)















CPR & first aid
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Matrix 3 .  Alaska Commercial Fishing Injury Countermeasures




Evaluate impact of manage-
ment regimes for fisheries























Recommended for use in the Gulf of Alaska and Eastern Bering Sea.




The temperature scale has been relabeled to provide for unusually low humidity (20-50%) condi-
tions.  Recommended for use in the Gulf of Alaska and by forecasters only.
Source:  From Arctic Environmental Information and Data Center.  Alaska Marine Ice Atlas.  1983.
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